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We analyze wage discrimination against foreign male workers in Gennany with
respect to different nationality groups and focused on its interaction with occupational
segregation. We found evidence ofstrong occupational segregation, which we mainly
attribute to institutional factors but also to different endowments with human capital.
For the measurement of wage discrimination itself we applied a tobit estimation
procedure to the wage equation and carried out the usual Blinder/Oaxaca
decomposition in the second step. We found a slight discrimination against all foreign
male workers together, but considerably greater discrimination for some nationality
groups such as East Europeans and persons from the Middle and Far East. The
additional consideration ofoccupational segregation did not affect these results much.
However, by far most 'of the wage differentials between Gennans and foreign
nationality groups could be attributed to different endowments with human capital.
JEL-Classitication: F22, 115, 131, J71
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Discrimination is certainly one of the most controversial issue in studying the labour
market performance of minority groups and of women. From a theoretical point of
view, the seminal work ofBecker (1957, rev. 1971) and the many theoretical articles
that followed (see the survey by Cain 1986) have contributed to a better
understanding of the phenomenon of discrimination. However, an empirical
measurement ofthe extent of discrimination existing in the labour market has yet not
been satisfactorily performed with a wide range ofestimates in empirical studies. This
is mainly due to the difficulty involved in making an accurate distinction between the
impact of individual labour market characteristics and the impact of discrimation on
labour market outcomes.
While most empirical studies concentrate on discrimination with respect to wages,
discrimination can also affect other labour market outcomes. In particular,
discrimination may take place in the hiring process, with respect to occupational
attainment, and to job advancement. Those kinds ofdiscrimination also lead to lower
average wages for the group concerned, although the particular group might be payed
the "same wage for the same kind of job". Whereas a broad definition of
discrimination would include this kind of discrimination, "pure" wage discrimination
would ignore it.
This study focuses on discrimination against male foreign workers with different
nationalities in Germany. In contrast to most studies in the literature, the group under
investigation here is not identified by race, ethnicity or gender, but by nationality.
Whereas many discrimination issues about race and ethnicity may be extended to
include nationality, there are some institutional regulations and some so-called pre-
market factors which make a special treatment of nationality groups necessary. This
is mostly due to the fact that many foreigners are immigrants. Those immigrants are
usually subject to the restrictive German rules oflabour market access. Many ofthese
people have acquired an education and training in their home country which is only
partly transferable to the German labour market and is frequently assigned a lower
value by the market. Since the importance of these factors vary by nationality, the
study will be based on a disaggregated analysis of 14 nationality groups.
Based on the fundamental methodology developed by Blinder (1973) and Oaxaca
(1973) there have been a lot ofempirical studies which tried to determine the degree
of wage discrimination against women and racial minorities. Most of the studies
focused on discrimination in the American and British labour market (see the surveys
ofCain 1986 and BlauIFerber 1987, see also Stewart 1983, Gill 1994). The empirical
evidence on wage discrimination in Germany is, however, relatively small. There are
three studies by Gerlach (1987), Licht/Steiner (1993) and Diekmann et a!. (1993)
- 1-which focus on wage discrimination against women. The only study analysing wage
discrimination against foreigners is the latter study by Diekmann et al. (1993) who
find a modest discrimination against foreigners. However, this study suffers from
methodological problems: The authors do not distinguish between nationality groups,
and they base their analysis on total net individual income rather than individual
labour income. Furthermore, they treat income as a continuous variable in an OLS
estimation although the underlying data stems from the German labour force survey
where income is coded in categories and is censored from above.
There are some more German studies based on the Socio-Economic Panel which
compare the labour income of German workers and workers from different guest-
worker countries (Seifert 1994) and also analyze in addition the assimilation of
foreigners from guest-worker countries with respect to wages (Dustmann 1993,
Pischke 1992, Schmidt 1992, Licht/Steiner 1994). However, none of these studies
analyze the aspect ofdiscrimination itself
l
•
In. contrast to the study by Diekmann et aI., this study could base the analysis on a
dataset which provides accurate information on wages. Due to the high number of
observations and detailed information on the nationality of the worker, it was also
possible to evaluate the issue of discrimination separately for different nationality
groups. This distinction turned out to be of crucial importance. The high number of
observations also enabled us to analyze the impact of occupational segregation in
detail; however, though we find considerable extent of occupational segregation, it
does not seem to influence the discrimination results much.
The remainder of the study is organized as follows: Section 2 provides some
information on the institutional framework behind the employment of foreign workers
inGermany and the extent ofinstitutional discrimination implied by these regulations.
Section 3 gives the empirical results on discrimination. First the dataset is described
in detail and absolute wage differentials for men and women are shown based on
quartiles of the respective wage distributions. Then empirical evidence on the
occupational segregation of foreigners is related separately by nationality group.
Based on a specially designed econometric model the issue ofwage discrimination is
evaluated empirically, first using a likelihood ratio test ofequality of parameters and,
secondly, the Blinder/Oaxaca decomposition. Section 4 swnmarizes the results and
draw conclusions.
1 According to the assimilation hypothesis which dates back to Chiswick (1978), recent
immigrants earn less than comparable natives. This is not due to discrimination, however, but to
the devaluation of the human capital they acquired in the home country. Chiswick further
assumes that immigrants invest more heavily in their human capital so,that they finally earn even
more than comparable natives.
-2-2 Discrimination against foreigners in Germany:
Institutional factors and discriminatory behaviour by
employers
Arrow (1973) defmes discrimination as "the valuation in the labour market of
personal characteristics of the worker that are unrelated to productivity". This
definition clearly indicates the need to separate productivity fact~rs from
discrimination factors. However. it does not say anything about the types of
discrimination which may lead to this different valuation given the same productivity.
As mentioned earlier. the most important labour market outcomes which could be
affected are - according to the different stages in the employment process - the hiring
process._ occupational attainment and job advancement. and finally the wages. Since
discrimination with respect to the first three factors leads to different wages even if
productivity does not differ between workers. these kinds ofdiscrimination must also
be taken into consideration when only wage discrimination is underinvestigation.
For the German case. it is important to note that a great deal ofdiscrimination already
takes place implicitly via institutional regulations. New immigrants from overseas
countries are particularly affected by this. Thus. German law stipulates in principle
that any foreigner who wants to work in Germany needs a work permit which will be
granted after certain requirements are fulfilled. Only some subgroups are exempted
from this rule. Inparticular. these subgroups are:
- Foreigners from other countries of the European Union or from,the European
Economic Area (EEA).
- Foreigners with a residence title called Aufenthaltsberechtigung (requiring among
others a duration ofstay ofeight years and a secure subsistence).
- Foreigners in certain types of occupations (artists, athletes, journalists, some
scientists. etc.).
For foreigners who do not belong to one ofthese groups. there are two types ofwork
permits. The general work permit is restricted to the employer (or at least to the local
labour market) and only allows the type of job it is issued for. It usually applies to
new migrants. The special work permit does not have a factual or spatial restriction.
but it usually requires the individual work between four to six years in the German
labour market or. alternatively. possess a German education. If one of these
requirements is fulfilled, the foreigner has a claim towards a special work permit.
Forthe general work permit, the so-called native privilege has to be observed. Itsays
that the work permit may only be granted ifno German or other privileged foreigner
- 3 -(foreigners who are exempted from the requirement of a work permit) is available for
the job concerned. As a rule, the work permit is generally refused to those foreigners
who would establish their right of residence only by starting a new job in Germany
(that means no family members, asylum seekers or refugees). However, certain
groups offoreigners have a better chance ofgetting by the native privilege barrier:
- Foreigners from other industrialized countries.
- Foreigners who are employed not more than three months the year (seasonal
workers).
~ Foreigners in certain types of occupations (language teachers, speciality cooks,
some social workers, workers inthe nursing sector, and some scientists).
The institutional regulations just presented are mainly aimed at protecting the natives
in the labour market. However, they also implicitly lead to the following kinds of
discrimination:
- Hiring process: Foreign immigrants who come from countries outside the EU and
the EEA have more problems finding a job since they need a general work permit.
Forforeign immigrants from non-industrialized countries it is even more difficult to
get a general work permit (as well as for the othernon-privileged groups).
- Occupational attainment: There are certain kinds of occupations which are more
easily accessible to foreign immigrants.
Table 1: Nationality Groups byImmigrantCohorts (in %)
~grant
...,~...:" ... ,."~":'.':' :,,,,;,.",;,;,;,,";••,,;.:.;.:.,;.;.;.;.;.,.;.,>:.;.•.-;.;'.';';':' ....Nz""·<NarloMliryGroup·
Plhorts 1U YU IT OR E PO AU 01 EE AF NE FE ON IOlal
..•..... ~ .., ... ~ ........~.., .
Duration ofStay
up 10 1year 3 3 3 3 1 3 4 10 23 16 8 15 14 6
1to 4years 6 4 6 10 4 6 7 13 24 16 17 26 27 10
4to 8years 4 2 5 3 1 5 6" 12 13 13 30 18 19 7
810 15 years 14 8 13· 7 5 9 13 16 14 18 19 26 17 13
more than 15 y. 34 59 40 44 55 46 43 25 15 24 9 5 13 35
Born in Gennany 10 9 14 14 18 8 13 13 4 1 3 0 5 10
Immigr. as child 29 14 19 19 17 24 13 10 7 13 13 9 6 19




Owncalcu1alions basedona70% sub5ample oftheGeunanlabourforce survey. April 1991.
-4-Both implicit types of discrimination by law have the effect that foreign immigrants.
from certain countries can only choose between certain types ofjobs and occupations.
However, only a small portion of the foreign labour force are recent immigrants, the
majority either having lived in Germany for many years or being part of the second
generation offoreigners who were born orhave at least has grown up in Germany. In
1993 about 2.75 million foreigners were working in Germany, but only 6.3% had a
general work permit and 32.1% had a special work permit. However, as shown by
table 1, in some nationality groups the percentage of recent immigrants can be quite
high. Implicit institutional discrimination is of considerably greater importance to
these groups.
Whereas German legislation affects the,occupational structure ofthe foreign workers,
it does not influence the wage-setting process itself. That means that, at least from the
institutional side, there is nothing causing "pure" wage discrimination.
Implicifinstitutional discrimination may be coupled with employer discrimination. In
a recent study, Kenney/Wissoker (1994) analyze the discriminatory hiring practices of
American employers. Using the so-called audit methodology, they find that Hispanic
job-seekers are discriminated in all different phases ofthe hiring process compared to
Anglo job-seekers. Gillmeister et al. (1989) find for Germany that nationality plays a
crucial role in the hiring process. However, it is not clear whether the probable
discriminatory behaviourofsome employers affects the labour market participation of
foreigners itself or whether it leads to a selection of certain kinds of jobs and
occupations. The evidence for Germany shows that the participation rate among for-
eigners does not deviate much from that ofGermans
2 with comparable characteristics.
Moreover, the legal possibilities for employers to pay different wages to Germans and
foreigners are limited. The wage contracts negotiated between employer associations
and trade unions do not distinguish between Germans and foreigners. According to
the Federal Ministry for Labour and Social Affairs, 90% of all employees work in
industries with collective wage agreements. There is in general, however, still room
for wage discrimination, even when the employment relationship is governed by a
collective wage agreement: Germans may be classified in a higher wage group and
they may receive greater fringe benefits (see also Gillmeister et al. 1989).
Nevertheless, the scope forlegal wage discrimination seems to be limited
3
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2 The participation rate of foreigners is actually slightly higher than for Germans. This result,
which applies to men and women, comes through even stronger when a group of control
variables is introduced. The only exceptions are foreigners from East Europe and non-
industrialized overseas countries who face the restrictive labour market access to its full extent
(see Velling 1994).
It should be noted that some groups of foreign workers (like seasonal workers and contract
workers) are not eligible for social security in Germany, which lowers the wages employers have
to pay. The empirical analysis in section three does not include these groups.
-5-3 Empirical evidence on wage discrimination in Germany
3.1 Wage Differentials by Foreign Nationality
The empirical analysis is based on a subsample taken from the so-called Historical
File kept at the Bundesanstalt flir Arbeit (Federal Employment SelVice) in Germany.
The History File is derived from the insurance accounts for all employees who were
eligible.to receive social security after 1975, which covers about 80% of total
employment in Germany. It consists of all entries in these accounts which were
recorded in the fifteen year period, in particular the initial registration and termination
of each employment relationship, changes and interruptions in these employment
relationships, and the mandatory declaration of basic employment data at the end of
each year (see Velling/Bender 1994).
For research purposes, a one percent sample has been taken from this dataset (IAB-
sample)~Even this sample taken from the Historical File contains about 460 thousand
cases over the period of fifteen years. In the present study, only data for the year
1989 is used, thus producing a total of about 230 thousand individuals. For each
individual, the dataon this initial entry inthe social security account in 1989 are used.
For individuals who did not leave their job during this year (about 190 thousand
persons), this entry corresponds to the annual declaration each employer has to make
at the end ofthe year. Forall others, the first interruption or termination declaration in
1989 is used. Each declaration contains information on age, sex, general education
and vocational training, occupational status, nationality, branch of industry, place of
work, occupation, full-time/part-time employment, actual apprenticeship, and gross
earnings for the period covered. In addition, two otherpieces ofinformation could be
used: First, by aggregation, the number of all employees of a single employer in the
Historical File who are eligible for social security could be determined and added to
the individual data as a proxy for firm size. Secondly, by using the retrospective
information in the Historical File, the date offirst entry in the Historical File could be
used.Ifthe yearoffirst employment was prior to 1975, this variable had to be treated
as left-censored, which is indicated by a dummy variable.
Comparedto sUlVey data on wages, themonthly wag~ rate contained in the Historical
File canbe considered to be ofextraordinary quality and precision since it is the basis
for the calculation of the amount of old age pension after retirement (Cramer 1986).
The high quality ofthe wage data, however, is crucial to an accurate measurement of
wage discrimination. Nevertheless, there are two characteristics of the wage data,
which have to be obselVed. First, there is no information on the weekly hours
worked, but only on full-time and part-time employment. The range of part-time
employment is between zero and somewhat less than full-time working hours, so we
-6-decided to completely dispense with the analysis ofpart-time workers
4
• In addition to
this, all apprentices were dropped from the samples. Secondly, the wages are
censored from above at a level ofDM 6,100. This censoring is caused by the fact that
contributions to social security must only be payed for that part of the wage which
lies below the so-called Beitragsbemessungsgrenze (contribution assessment ceiling).
Consequently, the part of the wage exceeding this ceiling is not reported. This
censoring does not affect the calculation of percentiles (as long as the ceiling lies in
the upper percentile), but it does affect the calculation of the moments of the wage
distributions as mean and variance. Therefore, a tobit procedure is required to
overcome this latterproblem as shown later.
The other central variable is the nationality. Nationality is coded in the Historical File
with three digits distinguishing among about 150 nationalities altogether. It was
therefore necessary to group nationalities. The grouping conducted in such a way that
we ended up with 14 foreign nationalities. The grouping was conducted according to
the following three considerations:
- The different institutional regulations depending on nationality necessitate the
separation of ED nationalities, nationalities of other industrialized countries (01)
and all other countries. A further institutional aspect is the easier labour market
access for foreigners with long durations of stay who are concentrated among the
former "guest-worker" countries (see table 1 above). Those foreigners with guest-
worker nationalities
6 and who have recently entered the labour market consist
mainly of second generation foreigners or recently immigrated family members.
Either group is subject to an easier labour market access.
- Education and skills acquired in the home country have different degrees of
difficulty in terms of their transferability to the German labour market. This is
especially true of language skills. Austrians (AU) are therefore regarded
separately7. Moreover, the average human capital of a nationality group is highly
(
4 The wage of full-time empldyed workers still contains some variation, since the working hours
per week may still be in a range between 35 and 40 hours. Also overtime and shift premiwns
may distort the comparison of wages, especially if it overproportionally accrues to foreign
workers. Nevertheless, we think that this kind of measurement error in the data is not large
enough to affect the results on discrimination considerably.
S We also did not include apprentices since wages of apprentices comprehend a (negative)
compensating wage differential for the accruing training costs.
6 The guest-worker nationalities are Turkey (TV), (fonner) Yugoslavia (YU), Italy (IT), Greece
(GR), Spain (E), and Portugal (PO).
7 The Swiss could also have been analyzed separately. However, the number of Swiss employees
working in Gennany is tiny, and not all Swiss have Gennan as their mother tongue.
- 7 -important with respect to statistical discrimination
8
• This is one of the reasons for
separating Asians into relatively highly qualified Middle Eastern persons (NE) and
less qualified Far Eastern persons (FE).
- The argument on discrimination originating from personal prejudice is that the
dislike of foreigners who belong to another ethnic group or to another culture leads
to certain discriminating behaviour which could eventually have the effect of lower
wages (Becker 1971). Those foreigners may also have more problems assimilating.
Both arguments suggest a need for separate treatment ofnationalities with different
ethnicities and different cultures. Therefore, overseas nationalities are divided into
Africans (AF), Middle Eastern people, Far Eastern people and foreigners from
other countries (ON). East Europeans (EE) form a reference group.
Figure la: Distribution ofMonthly Wages among Full-










TU YU IT GR E PO EU AU OJ EE AF NE FE ON D
Nationality Groups
Source: OwncalcuIalions based on aparticularly designed sub5ample from the JAB
sample ofthe Historical File; see table 3for the abbreviation<; ofnationality ~.
In figures 1a and 1b, the wage distributions offoreigners ofdifferent nationalities and
Germans are compared for both genders using the boundaries of the lower three
quartiles ofboth distributions. Inno group were more than 25% censored from above,
so the calculations ofquartiles were not affected bythe censoring problem. Figures 1a
8 Statistical Discrimination is caused by the screening problem employers face in the hiring process
(see Aigner/Cain 1977). One screening device is the average qualification for the group the
applicant belongs to. Since the average qualification is low for most nationality groups, this
might be a source ofdiscrimination.
- 8 -and Ib clearly show that the wage distribution for most nationality groups lies below
the wage distribution for Germans. The differences are more pronounced for men
than for women. Foreigners from industrialized countries (Austria, the European
Union and other industrialized countries) apparently earn more than Germans on
average, foreign women from Africa and foreign men from the Far East can
predominantly be found at the lowerend ofthe overall wage distribution.
Figure 1b: Distribution ofMonthly Wages among Full-










TU YU IT GR E PO EU AU OJ EE AF NE FE ON D
Nationality Groups
Sowre: Own calculalions based ona particularly designedsubsample from !helAB
sample ofthe Historical FIle; see table 3for the abbreviations ofnationality groups.
An interpretation of this unconditioned wage distribution, however, could easily be
misleading. First, the productivity and discriminatory factors have not been
disentangled yet. Tttis will be done in section 3.3. Secondly, one has to keep in mind
that part-time employment is excluded and the participation process is not considered
(both of which are particularly important for women). The incorporation of the
selection process of part-time employment or participation could clearly change the
picture if it led to an over-representation of certain groups in the total employee
population. Therefore, the total wage distributions would probably look different if
the total potential labour force was included.
3.2 Occupational segregation
In recent studies on the measurement of discrimination, the role of occupational
segregation as a source of wage differentials is emphasized. Most of these studies
- 9-(1)
consider occupational segregation in the context of gender discrimination, but some
studies have extended this issue to race and ethnicity discrimination (Gill 1994,
Stewart 1983). Fordiscrimination by foreign nationality, occupational segregation can
also be assumed to be of major importance. Thus, the institutional framework may
already cause a selection by foreigners of certain occupations, as some occupations
can be performed by new immigrants without any, or under reduced, labour market
restrictions. Another reason for such a selection may be the difference in the ease of
transferability of education and skills depending on the occupation. Employment in
the service sector, where language skills are usually required, is not possible for most
of the immigrants. Other occupations can even only be practized with education and
skills which have been acquired in Germany (e.g. lawyers, physicians, and dentists).
For this reason, it is important to know, first, the level of occupational segregation
depending on nationality group is and, secondly, how occupational segregation
contributes to an explanation of the wage differentials between foreigners and
Germans. The level ofoccupational segregation can be determined on the basis ofthe
measures for occupational segregation proposed in the literature. We will use two
indices. The first one is the classical Dissimilarity Index D suggested by
Duncan/Duncan (1955), the second one the G-segregation index proposed by Butler
(1987) and extended by Silber (1989). The D-index is defmed as:
D=O.5· ilf;_~
i"'l F Nl
where Fi is the number of employees of a foreign nationality group, and Ni is the
number of German employees in occupation i. Constructing a 'Lorenz-like'
segregation curve, the D-index can be interpreted as the greatest vertical distance
between the curve and the diagonal. The D-index enjoys great popularity and is
applied to a variety of segregation issues. This may be partly due to its easy
computability and partly to the long time it has been around. One major drawback,
however, is that the D-index puts equal weights to all groups. The other index used
here, the G-segregation index, overcomes this problem by additionally considerating
the weights ofeachoccupational group:
(2) G = 0.5·i i N; ._N j I-f;_/_N-'-i -_F~j_/_N.....,j
i"'l j"'l N N F / N
The G-index corresponds to the usual Gini-index, which is widely used in the income
inequality literature. It can be interpreted geometrically as twice the area lying
between the segregation curve and the diagonal. Table 2 shows the values of the D-
index (called Duncan) and the G-index (called Gini) for different nationalities,
separately for men and women. The values shown in the table are based on two-digit
occupational classifications distinguishing between 41 occupations. The same
calculations have been repeated on more disaggregate levels (two digits with 86
- 10-occupations and three digits), but this only raised the magnitude of the values
9 and
had no significant influence on the order ofthe nationality groups.
Table 2 shows separately for men and women that the differences in the occupational
structure between Gennans and foreigners are smallest with respect to the
industrialized countries (which also had the highest earnings; compare figures la and
Ib). They are the highest for the guest-worker countries (with the exception ofSpain)
and for Africans and Far Eastern persons. However, compared to the differences
between Gennan men and women (which are shown on the bottom line of the table),
they are still low. The results hold for both indices, which are different in tenns of
magnitude but not in the ranking ofthe nationalities.
Table 2: Measures of Occupational Segregation by Nationality Group - Men and
Women
F'lationality Men Women
Groups Duncan L.. GiQi Dun J Gini , .....Clm....... ............
Turkey 43.3 57.4 50.5 60.6
(former) Yugoslavia 36.6 50.8 47.9 57.7
Italy 40.3 51.5 41.3 51.1
Greece 44.9 56.1 54.4 62.7
Spain 30.6 41.5 34.7 41.2
Portugal 42.4 53.7 49.2 57.7
Other European Union 13.4 18.9 13.5 17.7
Austria 15.0 21.0 9.6 14.2
Other industr. countries 24.5 32.8 14.2 22.9
East Europe 30.3 42.2 31.8 40.5
Africa 40.6 52.4 41.2 53.8
Middle East 26.1 35.4 25.0 32.9
Far East 43.5 54.9 44.3 51.3
Other overseas countries 18.8 24.8 16.7 21.9
All foreigners 33.5 42.6 37.3 45.3
Women (compared to men) 54.1 79.0 - -
NOllce:
Soun:e:
CalcuIa1ions are based on 41 occupaI1ons. which provide sengb1e aggregates of the 86 two-digil
occupations distinguished in the ·tlassificalion ofoccupations':
Specially designed sul&unp1e fimn the lAB sample ofthe Historical FIle, daia on 1989.
See Deutsch et aI. (1994) for an explanation why the indices increase with the level of
disaggregation.
- 11 -Occupational segregation evidently seems to be an important phenomenon with
respect to the employment patterns offoreigners. However, itis a priori not clear how
it is related to wage discrimination. Ifoccupational segregation were solely caused by
discrimination itself, the measurement of wage discrimination without controlling for
occupational structure would include both "pure" wage discrimination and
discrimination according to occupational segregation. By controlling for occupational
structure, one would isolate the "pure" wage discrimination. Some authors, however,
argue that occupational segregation is not only determined by discrimination, but also
by voluntary occupational choice (e.g. Gill 1994). Therefore, it is important to
disentangle these two kinds of occupational determination. Without this, the
discriminatory effect of occupational segregation would be overestimated. We think
this argument is particular important for the analysis of gender discrimination.
However, in the present context, as we are comparing foreigners and Germans of the
same gender, the role of occupational segregation which can be attributed to
voluntary occupational choice should be ofminorimportance.
3.3 Econometric modelling ofthe measurement ofwage
discrimination
The usual way to evaluate wage discrimination is by using the methodology first
proposed by Blinder (1973) and Oaxaca (1973). The idea is to decompose the wages
for Germans and foreigners into a part which can be explained by productivity
differences and the remainder, which may be caused by discrimination. A common
way to approximate productivity differences is to use a Mincer-type human capital
wage equation:
(3)
The vectorx essentially contains the standard human capital variables, such as labour
market experience, education, and job tenure, but also a vector of dummy variables
for each occupation which are supposed to capture the effect of occupational
segregation. Equation (3) can also be regarded as a hedonic wage equation.
Discrimination against group j is indicated by the significantly different coefficients
I3j.
Discrimination may take place in either direction simultaneously, which means some
coefficients for foreign workers may be higher than the coefficients for Germans and
some may be lower. In order to gain an impression ofthe overall wage discrimination
against a group, Blinder (1973) and Oaxaca (1973) recommended evaluating all
explanatory variables x at their sample means x(or sample proportion if dummy
variables are used), weight these values with the estimated (unbiased) coefficients,
and calculate the predicted logarithmic wages (which are identical to the sample mean




The difference in the mean logarithmic wage can then be expressed in the following
way (Reimers 1983, Oaxaca/Ransom 1994):
(5) lnw;-lnw; =(x~. W +x~(I -W))(~j -~G),+rx~ -x~~w. ~G +(1 -W)~j~
discrin1ination e~nt
Thus, the differential between average wages can be decomposed into a
discriminatory component and an endowment component which captures the different
productivities ofthe groups considered. The matrix W detennines how the differences
in the coefficients in the discriminatory component and the sample means in the
endowment component are evaluated. The most frequently used weighting matrix is
the identity matrix (W =I). In this case, discrimination is evaluated for the sample
means of the foreign nationality group x j ' and the productivity effect is measured
using the coefficient vector ofthe Germans ~G. This weight as well as its counterpart
W =0 were first recommended by Blinder (1973) and Oaxaca (1973). However, both
weights have been criticized for their arbitrariness: If discrimination really takes
place, ~G and ~ j are both distorted by discrimination, and the "market price" ~* must
lie somewhere in between these two. Therefore, W has to be chosen so that the last
term in (5) yields an approximation of this ~*. Thus, Cotton (1988) has suggested a
diagonal matrix be used with the sample share of the reference group (here: the
Germans) on the diagonal for W. Neumark (1988) has recommended considering a ~.
which has been calculated by using a non-discriminatory wage structure . The W-
matrix in this case directly results from the last term in (5), which is equal to the
estimated ~.. In the present case, where the German workers count for more than
90% of total employment, Cotton's and Neumark's alternative specifications yield
results for the measurement of discrimination quite similar to the results when using
W = I. Therefore, we only present results based onW = [10.
10 We also applied first the prQcedure which has been proposed by Newnark and secondly a matrix
W = a(these results are available from the author on request). For the Newnark procedure, the
- 13 -As mentioned above, the wage variable in our dataset is censored from above at a
level of DM 6,100 (= exp(a». Thus the observed logarithmic wage lnw can be
defined with respect to the unobserved real logarithmic wage lnw* as:
(6) {
lnW~
lnw; = a I
for lnwi* <a
for lnw; ~ a
Equations (3) and (6) form the standard Tobit Type I model (e.g. Amemiya 1985:
363). The likelihood function ofthis Tobit model is given by:
(7) L= I1[l-<I»(a-Xj/~j)/(j)]. I1(j-l<1>(Yj-Xij'~j)/(j)
~=a ~<a
where <I> and <I> are the distribution and density ~ction of the standard normal
variable. Maxiriiizing (7) with respect to ~j and Q' yields consistent estimates for all
coefficients. One ofthe consequences ofthe ceiling in equation (6) is that the sample
means oflnWij* cannot be calculated directly like inequation (3) since the lnWij* which
are larger than a are not observable. Instead, the predicted values of lnwij*
conditioned onthe sample means ofthe regressors have to be applied directly, that is:
1\ 1\
lnw;-lnw~
= X;~ j -X~~G
(8) = X;~ j - X~~G + X;~G - X~~G
1\ 1\ 1\ 1\
• R • R • R • R =lnw (Xj,Pj)-lnw (xj,PG)+lnw (Xj,PG)-lnw (XG,PG)
, discrimination I , endo.wment I
Plugging in the tobit estimates for ~j and ~G, the wage differential can easily be
decomposed into the two components.
results on the percentage discrimination against nationality groups (table 4 below) did not
deviate from those with a W = [ weighting matrix by more than 0.4 percentage points. The
deviations in the second case were more pronounced. However, with two exceptions the
qualitative results did not change: For the Turkish and the Portugese male worker, we measured
a discrimination against about 10% with W = 0 but no discrimination obtained with W = [.
Nevertheless, for the reasons given in the text we think that the results with W = [ are more
appropriate to evaluate the extent ofdiscrimination.
- 14-3.4 Human capital factors and the measurement ofproductivity
As we have defmed discrimination to be that part of the wage differential which
cannot be explained by productivity factors, the extent of discrimination strongly
hinges on an accurate measurement of productivity itself. As stated above,
productivity here is approximated by the effect of the usual human capital factors on
wages. Table 3 contains the summary statistics for the human capital factors of male
workers
ll for each nationality group, all foreigners, and Germans.
The human capital variables considered here are as follows: Labour market
experience is measured by the difference between current age and school-leaving age.
School-leaving age has been assumed to be 16 in case of no Abitur, 19 with Abitur
and 24 for individuals with a university degree. For foreigners, experience captures
both experience on the German labour market and experience on the home labour
market (as far as persons have worked in their home country). Experience enters into
th~ estimation equation in cubic form. Education is measured in three categories,
Abitur (as the highest secondary school degree), University Degree (Fachhochschule
or UniversWit), and no formal education as a reference category. In addition,
vocational training within the German dual system is also taken into account. A
further variable in this line is the occupational status, which distinguishes among
master craftsmanlforeman, skilled blue-collar worker, and white-collar worker (the
reference group is unskilled blue-collar worker). This variable can be regarded as a
cross between a qualification and a job advancement index. Finally, as mentioned
earlier, we have information which year the individual was first registered in the
Historical File left-censored in 1976. This information has been used to construct an
index for the German labour market experience of foreigners. For foreigners who
have spent part oftheir working life in their home country, the reciprocal ofthe years
on the German labour market is used in the estimation
12
• For Germans and foreigners
who exclusively worked in Germany a value ofzero is applied. Inaddition, also those
foreigners whose first year in the German labour market was before 1976 received a
value of zero. Given the functional form of the reciprocal, however, this
approximation should n'?t matter too much. The variable called yfr (years since first
registration) enters into the estimationequation quadratically inits reciprocal.
11 We concentrate only on male workers in the empirical analysis. The reason is the bias which is
caused by the selectivity of the labour participation process and the part-timelfull-time choice
women make (see the discussion below).
12 In most of these cases, this variable should be equal to"years since migration" used by Grenier
(1984) in a similar study.
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experience 19.6 26.4 21.7 24.1 24.8 22.8 20.5 22.3 18.6 19.4 22.3 18.9 16.9 21.0 21.5 21.2
education
abitur 0.4 0.8 0.4 0.8 1.0 1.6 3.8 3.5 4.7 4.3 2.2 2.9 6.2 3.3 1.5 2.6
university degree 1.1 0.8 0.5 1.2 2.7 0.0 10.2 10.9 20.0 10.7 4.9 19.5 9.2 8.9 3.7 7.7
vocational training 20.0 445 26.1 22.1 38.0 23.6 495 64.4 42.0 49.0 25.2 28.2 25.7 40.0 31.8 70.8
occupationalsta~
master craftsman! 0.3 0.2 0.5 0.5 0.7 0.8 0.5 3.3 1.1 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.5 3.2 foreman
skilled blue collar 24.0 46.1 26.8 213 37,.8 27.6 28.7 34.7 16.3 33.0 26.0 17.8 19.5 31.5 29.0 36.5 worker
white collar 3.0 4.7 4.9 6.1 10.9 3.6 35.9 41.1 533 22.8 12.3 36.8 20.3 27.2 11.7 35.6 worker
years sincefirst 6.8 7.6 8.0 5.6 7.1 5.9 6.8 6.5 5.3 5.0 6.1 5.7 5.8 6.9 6.6 -
registration (yfrt" 21.4 12.9 24.6 24.7 9.4 14.4 41.7 28.4 435 52.8 46.8 54.0 68.0 36.2 26.4 -
number of 4,123 1,774 1,360 592 405 250 763 599 276 394 365 174 369 213 11,657 105,204 observations
thereof: censored 24 19 12 6 7 - 72 81 42 22 10 9 12 13 329 8,564
Note: .•Mean values are printed in nonoal type. percentages in itaIics.
..FIrst line: Means only apply to immigrant workers, second line: percentages of immigrant workers (= positive yfr).
Abbreviations: TU=Turkey, YU =Yugoslavia, IT=Italy, OR=Greece, E=Spain, PO= Portugal, EU =other European Union member countries, AU = Austria.
OJ=other industrialized countries, EE=East Europe, AI'=Africa, NE=Middle East. FE=Far East, ON=other nationalities
Source: Speciallydesigned subsample from the lAB sample ofthe Historical File, data on 1989.As can be seen in table 3, human capital of foreigners varies a lot between the
nationality groups. Whereas foreigners from industrialized countries (EU, AU, 01)
and - with the exception of Mricans - from overseas countries and East Europe have
a high education on average, foreigners from guest-worker countries are all less well-
educated. The general education possessed by the former group is even higher than
the education possessed by Germans. The average for foreigners is characterized by a
high percentage of guest-workers in the sample, which leads to a low average
qualification for all foreigners as a group. The variable yfr shows a relative low
variation among the nationaliy groups with an average German labour market of
experience between 5.0 and 8.0 for new immigrants. However, the percentage of
foreigners who have foreign labour market experience (the number in italics) is by far
higher for the nationality groups in the columns on the right.
The human capital variables shown in table 3 have been complemented in the
regression by a firm size variable to control for the well-known fact that ceteris
paribus large firms pay higher wages than small firms (see Gerlach/Schmidt 1989,
Schmidt/Zimmermann 1991, Bellmann/Kohaut 1995). In addition, the federal state
the employer is located in has been used to control for regional wage disparities.
Federal states are admittedly only a rough contol in this perspective, and more
disaggregate information would be desirable. However, federal states were the only
regional information provided by the dataset. Finally, dummies for occupational
groups (like in table 2) have been used in some of the estimation equations to
evaluate the effect of occupational segregation on the measurement of
discriminination.
Before turning to the estimation itself, a few points concerning the specification in
equation (1) are in need of some further discussion: Can the described human capital
variables be assumed (statistically) exogenous, Le. not correlated with the error term,
thus assuring the consistency of the estimated coefficients? How does the selectivity
of labour market participation (especially for women) affect the estimation? Finally,
does the meaning of the variables used to measure productivity differ between
Germans and foreigners?
Statistical Exogeneity \
There is almost no regressor in the Mincer-type wage equation which has not been
regarded as endogeneous in some study. The qualification variables are often
regarded as endogeneous since current wages may have affected the investment in
human capital in the past if they could have been expected at the time of the
investment. We do not want to pursue this discussion here since we do not think that
the resulting bias is particularly large. Moreover, the bias will be even less
problematic for the measurement of discrimination if it has the same size for both
groups being examined. Another problem, however, is the possible omission of some
variables which are then included in the error term. With respect to foreigners, such
- 17 -variables are knowledge of Gennan language and acquaintance with Gennan
culture
l3
• It is true that the effect ofthis omission will be mitigated by the inclusion of
the variable "years in the Gennan labour market" (yfr); however, infonnation about
language acquisition especially during primary and secondary school age still remains
essentially uncovered. In particular, we are unable to distinguish between a foreigner
who immigrated in his adolescent years and a second-generation foreigner. This
drawback to the data has to be kept in mind, particularly with respect to the results
obtained for foreigners from guest-worker countries. The estimated coefficients ofthe
constant and some ofthe regressors may sufferfrom bias.
Selectivity ofLabour Market Participation
The selectivity of labour market participation may affect the correct measurement of
wage discrimination. The usual argument for the selectivity process into account in
the estimation is that its-omission would lead to biased coefficients when some of the
regressors are correlated with the selectivity tenn. Some authors doubt that this bias
influences the correct measurement of discrimination. Thus, Sapsford{fzannatos
(1993: 233) argue that wage discrimination is a phenomenon within the labour market
and does not influence those who do not participate. However, they overlook the fact
that wage discrimination may also affect the wage offers each individual receives
which are relevant to the participation decision. Ifwage offers for non-employed are
differently affected by discrimination than the wages ofthe employed, the omission of
the non-employed could affect the measurement ofdiscrimination.
Since we do not have any infonnation on individuals who are not employed, we are
not able to model the participation decision adequately. We therefore decided to
restrict the estimations to men for whom the selectivity problem is assumed to be of
minor importance
l4
• For men, the choice between full-time and part-time can also be
assumed to be less relevant, as we have restricted ourselves to full-time employment
only.
Measurement ofhuman capital variables
The last problem to be discussed is the appropriate measurement of the human capital
of Gennans and foreigners. The question to be posed is whether the different
qualification and education variables really measure the same thing for Gennans and
foreigners. The data set does not distinguish between a qualification which has been
acquired in the home country and a German qualification. Ifthe fonner qualification
undergoes considerable devaluation in the German labour market (which is a major
component of the assimilation hypothesis; see above), this qualification is given less
13 Ehrenberg/Smith (1991: 534) give further examplesfor such omitted variables.
14 Although we have admittedly ignored the participation decision ofunemployed men.
- 18 -value by the market, thus leading to lower expected Ws. This, in tum, could be
misinterpreted as labour market discrimination. Ofcourse, this effect matters only for
those nationalities with a relatively high portion ofhighly qualified workers where the
.transferability of qualification may be assumed to be considerably restricted. Since
we have no information where qualification have been acquired, it is difficult even to
estimate the bias caused by this effect for these countries. This point will be taken up
again in the discussion ofthe results.
3.5 Estimation Results
Using the estimation procedure outlined in section 3.3, we estimated the Mincer-type
human capital wage equation separately for each nationality group, for foreigners and
for G_ermans. The estimation results shown in table 4 can serve as basis for examining
discrimination in a two-fold way: First, a test on equality ofparameters can be carried
out. If the hypothesis of equal parameters cannot be rejected, discrimination will
probably not be the case. Secondly, the estimated coefficients can be used to
decompose the wage differential as shown in equation (8). Each procedure is
discussed in the following.
At fIrst glance, estimated coefficients are of similar size for the different nationality
groups and total foreigners on the one hand and Germans on the other. There are only
a few exceptions with respect to the coefficients for white collar workers and for
vocational training, but in these cases the standard errors are also quite high. In
general, the standard errors vary heavily with the sample size of the group under
investigation. Thus, the standard errors for Germans (with 105,204 observations) are
by far the lowest, with only about one-tenth of the standard errors for nationality
groups on average. The group with the highest standard errors (but only 174
observations) are the Middle Eastern persons with about 30 times as high standard
errors as the Germans. Consequently, the estimation results for the Germans can be
regarded as quite precise. This cannot be said for the estimates ofthe coefficients for
some nationality groups, however.
Therefore, the direct co,nparison of the estimated parameters hardly allows one to
draw any hard conclusions about the discrimination issue without taking the variation
of the estimates into account as well. For this reason, two tests have been carried out
which combine both pieces of information. The fIrst test is on the hypothesis that all
coefficients except the intercept are equal for the respective nationality group and
Germans. The second test also includes the restriction of equal intercepts. The null
hypotheses for either test can be expressed as:
- 19-Table 4: Tobit Estimation Results by Foreign Nationality Group and Germans (Men)
11] IYU I
IT I GR I
E I POl Foreig- Ger-
neTS mans
constant 7.38 7.21 7.03 6.97 6.97 7.20 7.27 7.26
(0.037) (0.096) (0.102) (0.136) (0.127) (0.140) (0.028) (0.008)
experience 0.06 0.08 0.08 0.05 0.10 0.11 0.05 0.06
(0.004) (0.009) (0.009) (0.014) (0.013) (0.018) (0.003) (0.001)
experience
2/100 -0.24 -0.28 -0.29 -0.18 -0.37 -0.43 -0.18 -0.15
(0.022) (0.043) (0.043) (0.070) (0.064) (0.093) (0.016) (0.005)
experience)/10000 0.29 0.29 0.33 0.20 0.44 0.55 0.19 0.14
(0.034) (0.062) (0.064) (0.100) (0.093) (0.139) (0.023) (0.008)
Abitur 0.15 -0.06 0.36 0.04 -0.15 -0.01 0.06 0.08
(0.063) (0.068) (0.132) (0.133) (0.129) (0.136) (0.023) (0.006)
.
university degree 0.51 0.38 0.50 0.43 0.55 - 0.39 0.42
(0.048) (0.074) (0.112) (0.130) (0.088) (-) (0.018) (0.005)
vocational training 0.03 0.03 0.05 0.11 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.07
(0.012) (0.015) (0.021) (0.039) (0.030) (0.052) (0.007) (0.003)
master craftsman! 0.22 0.22 0.29 0.26 0.50 0.31 0.28 0.33
foreman (0.079) (0.1l4) (0.104) (0.169) (0.145) (0.188) (0.038) (0.006)
skilled blue-collar 0.06 0.10 0.08 0.14 0.09 0.03 0.08 0.11
worker (0.011) (0.015) (0.020) (0.039) (0.029) (0.049) (0.007) (0.003)
white-collar 0.02 0.21 0.24 0.18 0.24 0.06 0.28 0.29
worker (0.029) (0.033) (0.039) (0.060) (0.048) (0.095) (0.011) (0.003)
years since first -0.31 -0.56 -0.19 -0.54 -0.69 -0.49 -0.36 -
registration'l (0.070) (0.135) (0.135) (0.194) (0.291) (0.321) (0.043) (-)
years since first 0.17 0.53 0.12 0.40 0.76 0.38 0.20 -
registration-2 (0.080) (0.156) (0.149) (0.200) (0.338) (0.370) (0.047) (-)
sigma 0.254 0.249 0.266 0.280 0.226 - 0.289 0.287
number ofobservat 4,123 1,774 1,360 592 405 250 11,657 105204
likelihood ratio-x
2(24) 1509.1 700.2 866.2 367.0 265.5 - 5,694 63,427
McFadden Pseudo R
2 0.766 0.821 0.755 0.667 U83 0.355 0.549 0.565
test on eqU1J1 parameters
const.diff.: LR-X
2(22)I 362.0- 79.2- 137.9- 137.4- 46.7- 34.4"~1 247.6~1 -
const. eq.: LR-X
2 (23) 366.3- 82.4- 139.4- 139.6- 46.8- 34.4""2 249.7- -
NOle: Standard errors are m parentheses. The estunatlon also mcludes a conslant. three dwnmy vanables for fmn
size, and len dwnmies for federal states (but no dwnmies for occupational groups). The lest statistics for the
lest on equal parameters are marked by one (two) asterisk(s) if equal paramelers are rejected on the 10%
(5%) significance level. I OLS-estintation (because of no censoring in this case). R
2 shown is iP for the
OLS estimation. 2 Onedegree offreedom less.
Source: Specially designed subsample from the lAB sampleofthe Historical File. dataon 1989.
- 20-Table 4: (continued)
EU I AU I Sf ]",Q/';,J,hEoJYA, ,.lk\ ........ SN
constant 7.38 7.36 7.40 6.86 7.52 6.83 7.26 6.68
(0.134) (0.203) (0.207) (0.218) (0.179) (0.264) (0.164) (0.229)
experience 0.05 0.06 0.03 0.04 0.00 0.03 -0.00 0.09
(0.013) (0.017) (0.026) (0.022) (0.022) (0.033) (0.024) (0.033)
experience
2/100 -0.12 -0.18 -0.08 -0.16 0.12 -0.06 0.08 -0.27
(0.066) (0.085) (0.130) (0.113) (0.108) (0.176) (0.133) (0.165)
experience
3/lOOOO 0.07 0.17 0.07 0.21 -0.25 0.06 -0.16 0.27
(0.100) (0.128) (0.194) (0.173) (0.160) (0.275) (0.217) (0.245)
Abitur 0.12 0.10 0.12 0.02 0.03 0.41 0.04 0.27
(0.061) (0.085) (0.101) (0.086) (0.119) (0.182) (0.076) (0.165)
univetsity degree 0.50 0.40 0.36 0.42 0.54 0.43 0.33 0.44
(0.051) (0.069) (0.072) (0.079) (0.104) (0.104) (0.089) (0.120)
vocational training 0.10 0.05 0.02 0.07 0.01 -0.06 0.05 0.06
(0.028) (0.038) (0.057) (0.044) (0.048) (0.087) (0.052) (0.066)
master craftsman/ 0.25 0.31 0.52 -0.Q1 - - - -
foreman (0.153) (0.089) (0.200) (0.173) (-) (-) (-) (-)
skilled blue-collar 0.09 0.15 0.12 0.06 0.07 0.18 0.10 0.17
worker (0.032) (0.044) (0.073) (0.047) (0.048) (0.098) (0.058) (0.073)
white-collar 0.34 0.36 0.53 0.29 0.23 0.34 0.37 0.33
worker (0.034) (0.045) (0.059) (0.056) (0.069) (0.087) (0.064) (0.088)
years since first -0.28 0.06 0.14 0.22 -0.16 0.34 0.23 -0.64
registration·
1 (0.151) (0.241) (0.248) (0.198) (0.213) (0.369) (0.205) (0.382)
years since first 0.12 (0~~41j ",<0~~53~
-0.23 -0.14 -0.46 -0.37 0.57
registration·2 (0.162) (0.200) (0.218) (0.369) (0.206) (0.414)
sigma 0.300 0.344 0.322 0.329 0.299 0.350 0.326 0.358
number ofobservat 763 599 276 394 365 174 369 213
likelihood ratio-x
2(24) 541.8 305.1 243.2 205.7 218.6 162.7 282.6 145.8
McFadden Pseudo R
2 0.567 0.380 0.553 0.436 0.569 0.547 0.547 0.443
test on equalparameters '
const.diff.: LR-X
2 (22)I 33.8· 30.3 59.9" 50.7" 36.9·"2 56.5·"21108.4·~ 138.6·~I
const. eq.: LR-X
2 (23) 33.8· 37.1- 60.4- 94.9" 44.9·"2 100.2"2 213.2·"2 47.7·"2
Note: Standard enurs are m parentheses. The estunallOn also mcludes a constant, three dununy vanables for finn
size, and ten dummies for federal Stales (but no dummies for occupational groups). The lest statistics for the
lest on equal parameters are marked by one (two) aslerisk(s) if equal parameters are rejected on the 10%
(5%) significance level. 1 OLS-estimation (because of no censoring in this case), R' shown is jP for the
OLS-estimation. 2One degree offreedom less.
SOlD'Ce: Specially designed subsample from the lAB sampleofthe Historical File, data on 1989.
- 21 -Test!:
Test2:
rIo: ~jl = ~Gl
rIo: ~jl = ~Gl
for all I=1,..., L
for all I=0,..., L
where L is the number of slope coefficients, and ~jol~GO is the coefficient for the
intercept. Whereas the fIrst test is a test for no discrimination with respect to all
variables included (e.g. on different returns to education), the second testis a test for
the null hypothesis of no discrimination at all. If the null hypothesis cannot be




The two tests have been carried out as likelihood-ratio tests comparing the value of
the log-likelihood functions without any restriction with the corresponding values
under the restriction. The test statistics are shown in the two bottom lines of table 4
for all nationality groups and for total foreigners. Those statistics which are
signifIcant at the ten (five) percent level are marked by one (two) asterisk(s).
With the exception of Austrians and foreigners from other ED-countries, equality of
parameters between Gennans and the respective foreigner group can be rejected at
the 5% signifIcance level in all cases. However, also for these two groups the results
cannot be interpreted right away as evidence for equal parameters. For foreigners
from otherED-countries, the hypothesis ofequality fo parameters can still be rejected
at the 10% level, and for Austrians the hypothesis ofequal parameters can only be not
rejected if different intercepts are admitted. Thus, according to the test results,
absence ofdiscrimination inits strong defInition - equal parameters with respect to all
personal characteristics - seems only be possible for two nationality groups.
One has to keep in mind, that the defInition of discrimination used by the test just
described is quite strong since it postulates the equality ofall parameters. However, it
might well be that negative discrimination with respect to one variable is
counterbalanced by positive discrimination with respect to another variable. The test
would indicate that the parameters are not equal, but in reality an overall
discrimination against the total labour force ofone nationality group on average might
not be the case. This question ofdiscrimination can only be answered by carrying out
the total decomposition ofthe wage differential ~s showninequation (8).
Forthis purpose, the estimated coefficients intable 4 have been inserted into equation
(8). Thus, two "average" wage rates have been calculated for each nationality group:
15 As a hypothesis can only be rejected but never be confinned, the power of the test of equal
parameter is limited. If the hypothesis of equal parameters cannot be rejected at chosen
significance levels, this finding could well be the result ofno discrimination, but it could also be
the result of the low precision of some estimated parameters, which might particularly apply to
some nationality groups with low number ofobservations.
- 22-The predicted logarithmic wage based on the sample means of the explanatory
variables and the estimated coefficients for each group, and the predicted logarithmic
wage based on the sample mean for each nationality group and the estimated
coefficients for Germans. This information is sufficient to carry out the decomposition
into a discriminatory component and an endowment component. The corresponding
decomposition is shown in table 5. The left panel shows the decomposition based on
estimations which do not considerthe occupational structure ofthe nationality groups.
The decomposition in the right panel, however, is based on estimations including 40
dummy variables for occupational groups. The effect of occupational segregation can
be judged by comparing the results from the two panels.
Table 5: Decomposition ofWage Differentials between Foreigners and Germans -
Men (in %)
...................,.
"'Without Occupations With Occupations
Total Endow- Discrimi Total :Endow- Discrimi
ment nation ,.:. m~nt,.Mtj9Q
Turkey -16.2 -17.4 1.2 -15.7 -16.7 0.9
(former) Yugoslavia -10.6 -7.4 -3.2 -10.8 -7.1 -3.7
Italy -17.8 -14.8 -3.0 -17.1 -16.4 -0.7
Greece -17.1 -11.9 -5.1 -16.6 -12.6 -4.0
Spain -10.0 -6.3 -3.6 -9.1 -5.9 -3.2
Portugal -15.5 -12.7 -2.7 -14.4 -13.0 -1.4
Other Europ. Union -0.5 -0.3 -0.2 0.1 -1.5 1.7
Austria 9.1 4.1 5.1 10.2 3.5 6.7
Otherindustr. countr. 4.7 3.9 0.9 4.9 1.6 3.3
East Europe -20.8 I -7.2 -13.5 -19.7 I -8.4 -11.3
Africa -15.3 : -9.1 -6.2 -16.0 : -11.1 -4.9
Middle East -23.3 : -3.8 -19.5 -22.6 : -7.1 -15.6
-33.8 i -21.8
I
-15.8 -18.8 Far East -12.0 -34.7 I
I I
-7.2 Other overseas countr. -15.0 I -6.1 -8.9 -15.2 : -8.0
All foreigners '. -13.1 I -10.9 -2.2 -12.6 I -11.3 -1.3
NOllce:
Source:
MeasW'ed as the difference between estunated logantlumc wages.
Specially designed subsample from the lAB sample ofthe Historical File, dataon 1989.
Before coming to the interpretation, one clarifying commenthas to be made regarding
the first column in each panel. The numbers' shown are the absolute differences
between the estimated "mean" logarithmic wages of foreign and German workers.
For small values, this difference is approximately equivalent to the percentage wage
- 23 -difference referred to the wage of Germans
16
• If the sample means for these wages
could be used instead of the predicted wages, the two columns should show exactly
the same numbers. However, in this case the predicted "mean" logarithmic wages is
slightly different since the two specifications of the estimated coefficients and x
differ. Therefore, the two specifications of the estimated foreign-German wage
differentials also vary slightly.
The total wage differentials are disentangled into endowment and discrimination
effects in the second and third columns ofeach panel. Taking all foreigners together,
there is apparently almost no discrimination at all. However, if single nationality
groups are considered, we find substantial (more than 10%) discrimination for East
Europeans, Middle Eastern persons and Far Eastern persons. The extent of wage
discrimination for the last three groups is comparable to the findings in U.S. studies
on wage discrimination against black male workers (compare Cain 1986: table 13.7,
BlaulFerber 1987:- table 1). Discrimination against workers from guest-worker
countries is quite moderate, discrimination against Austrians is even slightly
positively. At the first glance this last result is surprising. One reason may be that
Austrians working in Germany are a positively selected group, being the most mobile
and flexible people in the overall Austrian labour force. Moreover, they do not suffer
much from the devaluation ofthe qualification acquired at home since they speak the
same language (they are the only group having German as mother tongue) and they
benefit from existing bilateral agreements between Germany and Austria concerning
mutual recognition of university and master degrees. However, this in terms of
magnitude still small amount of discrimination should not be overemphasized,
particularly because the test of equal parameters has indicated no significant
discrimination with respect to personal characteristics.
The endowment effect is particularly important for foreigners from guest-worker
countries and for Far Eastern persons and Mricans. It reflects the poor average
qualification possessed by these groups as shown in table 3.
The control for occupational segregation only has a minor influence on the results.
This can be seen by comparing the decompositions ofthe wage differentials between
the two panels in table 4. In general, including occupational groups in the estimation
equation slightly lowers the total wage differential and also the wage differential due
to discrimination whereas the endowment components are about the same on average.
A part ofthis finding could be attributed to the fact that some ofthe variables already
included - especially "white collar worker" - reflect some of the differing
occupational structure regarding foreign and German employment. However, we do
not think that this is the main reason for the weak effect of occupational segregation.
The wage discrimination we have found is apparently a matter of "pure" wage
16 TItis is can beexpressed formally as: Inwj -lnwG "" (Wj - WG)/wG.
- 24-discrimination and not of wage differences due to occupational segregation caused by
discrimination.
4 Summary and conclusions
We have analyzed wage discrimination against foreign male workers in Germany
with respect to different nationality groups and stressed its interaction with
occupational segregation. We have found evidence for strong occupational
segregation which WE have mainly attributed to institutional factors but also to
different endowments with human capital such as language and other country-specific
skills. However, we were not able to confmn a major contribution on the part of this
occupational segregation to an explanation for non-productivity-related wage
differentials between foreign nationality groups and Germans.
For the wage discrimination issue itself, we were able to use a dataset offering
particularly high-quality wage data. This dataset also provided us with high enough
number of observations and detailed enough information to allow us to distinguish
between 14 nationality groups among foreigners. We had to restrict our analysis to
men since the data did not allow us to consider the participation decision, which is
particularly important for women.
The discrimination issue was tackled in two ways. First we compared the estimated
coefficients of Mincer-type wage equations. Likelihood-ratio test for the restriction of
equal parameters for each nationality group and total foreigners on one hand and for
Germans on the other hand were carried out. However, the hypotheses of equal
parameters could only not be rejected with some confidence for Austrians and
foreigners from ED-countries (other than the guest-worker countries). In addition, if
positive and negative discrimination were occuring simultaneously, rejecting equal
parameters would still not indicate that discrimination was at work. We therefore
carried out a decomposition of wage differentials into an endowment and a
discrimination component.
For all foreigners put together, the total wage differential of 13.1 percent with respect
to German males could'be attributed, with 10.9 percent being accounted for by
endowment effects, and with 2.2 percent being accounted for by wage discrimination.
Thus, we estimated the discrimination component a bit smaller than Diekmann et al.
(1993) did who found 3.9 percent. In contrast, they obtained a value of 5.0 percent
for the endowment effect, which is less than half the value we came up with. We
believe that the difference in the results is mainly due to the different estimation
methodology employed and the different quality ofthe data used.
Compared to the findings contained in the American and British literature on wage
discrimination against minority groups, our estimates for total foreigners versus
- 25-Gennans can hardly be interpreted as serious discrimination. However, foreigners
themselves are quite a heterogeneous group. Thus, the results for all foreigners
together are mainly coined by those nationality groups who are quantitatively most
important, particularly Turks, who account for about one-third of all foreigners. This
might conceal real discrimination against some quantitatively less-important
nationality groups. Therefore, the discrimination issue has to be evaluated separately
for each nationality group. Correspondingly, we found strong evidence for
discrimination against male workers from East Europe, from the Middle East and
from the Far East - all nationality groups with a particularly high percentage of new
migrants.
One major issue in the measurement of discrimination is of course accurate control
for productivity-related wage differentials. The accurate control of productivity
differences, however, is often a problem in itself. This will particularly be the case if
the productivity measurement leads to systematic underestimation with respect to one
ofthe two groups compared. In our case we cannot exclude the possibility that some
of the human capital variables such as school education and vocational training are
qualitatively different for Germans and foreigners. This concerns particularly recently
migrated foreigners who have acquired their education in their home country. The
language as another human capital factor could not be considered in our estimation,
either. We partly control for these effects by using the assimilation variable "years
since migration", but there may still be some measurement error remaining. We still
think that our results are not affected too much by this aspect in terms of quality.
Nevertheless, we would have liked to have used panel information in order to better
evaluate this aspect, as panel data may be used to control for some individual- or
group-specific effects (like transferability of skills and language). It was not possible
to use this approach with our dataset, however, thus forcing us to leave this for future
research.
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